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Abstract—With more than 294 million registered domain
names as of late 2015, the domain name ecosystem has evolved
to become a cornerstone for the operation of the Internet.
Domain names today serve everyone, from individuals for their
online presence to big brands for their business operations. Such
ecosystem that facilitated legitimate business and personal uses
has also fostered “creative” cases of misuse, including phishing,
spam, hit and traffic stealing, online scams, among others. As a
first step towards this misuse, the registration of a legitimately-
looking domain is often required. For that, domain typosquatting
provides a great avenue to cybercriminals to conduct their crimes.
In this paper, we review the landscape of domain name
typosquatting, highlighting models and advanced techniques
for typosquatted domain names generation, models for their
monetization, and the existing literature on countermeasures.
We further highlight potential fruitful directions on technical
countermeasures that are lacking in the literature.
Keywords. Domain Names, Typosquatting, Defenses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the process of the domain name registration be-
gan in the 1990’s, cybercriminals have seized the opportunity
to profit on the backs of others by misusing such process in
so many ways [24], [33], [31]. As Internet commerce quickly
rose and more companies began registering domain names to
get a foothold on the action, certain individuals realized that
they could preemptively register these domain names on a first-
come first-serve basis. These so called “cybersquatters” would
purchase domain names in the hopes of selling them back
to companies and trademark owners for a substantial profit.
As these popular domain names attracted more users to their
websites, it was not long before cybercriminals recognized
that people often made mistakes when typing URLs into
their browsers–thus sparking a new form of domain name
exploitation called typosquatting.
In this paper, we survey the landscape of typosquatting,
which is the deliberate registration of a domain name that uses
typographical variants of other target domain names. Typically,
these variant domain names are generated in such a way as
to exploit common typographical errors made by users that
manually type URLs into web browsers. For example, the
popular social networking site Facebook was the target of
several typosquatters who registered domain names such as
www.fagebook.com and www.facewbook.com [29]. Unfortu-
nately for these typosquatters, they were ordered to transfer
over their domain names and pay Facebook up to $1.34 million
in damages.
As we will discuss in subsequent sections, other forms of
domain squatting have emerged that not only uses common ty-
pographical mistakes, but employs the use of (among others):
visually-similar letters [18], similar-sounding words [26] or the
exploitation of hardware errors that store domain names [28].
In addition, it has been shown that not only are the most
popular domain names targeted by typosquatters, the “long
tail” of the popularity distribution has also come under their
sights as potential targets for exploitation [30]. By providing
a comprehensive treatment of typosquatting, we hope that this
paper will catapult research on mitigating this problem.
Organization. In §II we review the anatomy of typosquatting.
In §III we review the monetization techniques of typosquat-
ting. In §IV we review the countermeasures to typosquatting.
In §V we provide concluding remarks and open directions.
II. TYPOSQUATTING ANATOMY
While typosquatting as a phenomenon is perhaps known
for many years, the term itself has been in use for almost two
decades. Several studies have been conducted to understand
models of typosquatting, including advanced techniques and
squatted domains features. In the following, we briefly review
the historical background of typosquatting, and follow it by a
technical anatomy of models, techniques and features.
A. Historical Background
The term typosquatter may have been coined as far back
as 1998 by R. C. Cumbow in The New York Law Journal
(NYLJ) [17], who was one of the first to write about this new
trend of cybersquatting. One of the first large-scale studies
on typosquatting was conducted in 2003 by Edelman [15],
who located more than 8,800 registered domains that were
minor typographical variations of popular domain names.
Surprisingly, most of these domain names were traced back
to one individual, John Zuccarini, who often redirected users
to sexually-explicit content and even used nefarious tactics to
“mousetrap” these users from leaving these sites (e.g. blocking
the ordinary operation of a browser’s Back and Close com-
mands). Some of these typosquatted domain names went so
far as to target websites frequentDly visited by children, such
as disenystore.com (a typo on disneystore.com)
which redirected to a website with sexually-explicit content.
B. Identifying Typo Domains: Models
Prior experiments conducted on the subject of typosquatting
typically began their data collection phase by first identifying a
set of domain names and then generating a list of possible typo
variations on those domain names. Often these experiments
used a subset of the top-ranking domain names according to
some domain ranking websites, such as Alexa. The rationale of
using such domains is that typosquatters will naturally target
the most popular domain names to increase the chances of
obtaining unsuspecting visitors. Table I summarizes these sev-
eral approaches of which authoritative domains they studied,
the number of possible typosquatted domains they generated,
and what percentage of them were active (i.e. resolved to
an IP address hosting a website). In the following section,
we describe the models that generated typos variations of an
authoritative domain.
Typo-Generation Models. One of the first and widely cited
approaches in this area was introduced by Wang et al. [32]
where given a target domain (e.g. www.example.com), the
following five typo-generation models are commonly used:
1) Missing-dot typos: this typo happens when the dot
following “www” is forgotten, e.g., wwwexample.com
2) Character-omission typos: this typo happens when one
character in the original domain name is omitted, e.g.,
www.exmple.com
3) Character-permutation typos: this typo happens when
two consecutive characters are swapped in the original
domain name, e.g., www.examlpe.com
4) Character-substitution typos: this typo happens when
characters are replaced in the original domain name by
their adjacent ones on a specific keyboard layout, e.g.,
www.ezample.com, where “x” was replaced by the
QWERTY-adjacent character “z”.
5) Character-duplication typos: this typo happens when
characters are mistakenly typed twice (where they
appear once in the original domain name), e.g.,
www.exaample.com
While this previous study presented the first attempt to
systematically understand techniques for typosquatting that are
most prevalent based on certain usage aspects, later studies
looked at exhaustively generating typo domains using other
methods. For example, a similar approach in 2008 by Banerjee
et al. [9] suggested the following methods for generating
typosquatted domains:
6) 1-mod-inplace: this typo happens when the typosquatter
substitutes a character in the original domain name with
all possible alphabet letters.
7) 1-mod-deflate: this typo happens when a typosquatter
removes one character from the original domain name
(or URL)—and unlike [32] where a specific character is
considered (e.g., dot), this work systematically considers
all possible characters as candidates.
8) 1-mod-inflate: this typo happens when a typosquatter
increases the length of a domain name (or URL) by
one character. Unlike in [32] characters are added based
on distance (e.g., using a keyboard layout), this work
considers all characters as potential candidates.
Certain aspects of the techniques proposed in [9] can be
viewed as generalization of the techniques proposed in [32].
For example, rather than substituting adjacent characters on a
keyboard as shown by Wang et al.’s fourth model, Banerjee et
al. substituted all possible alphabet characters when generating
typo domains. In addition, they also experimented with two
and three character modifications for their inplace, inflate
and deflate schemes thereby generating roughly three million
possible typo domain names starting with a corpus of 900
original domain names.
After probing for the existence of a possible typo do-
main, Banerjee et al. observed that approximately 99% of
the “phony” typosquatted sites they identified utilized a one-
character modification of the popular domain names they
targeted. Essentially, these are domain names that have a
Damerau-Levenshtein distance [22] of one from the domains
they target. The Damerau-Levenshtein distance is the mini-
mum number of operations needed to transform one string into
another, where an operation is defined as an insertion, deletion,
or substitution of a single character, or a transposition of two
adjacent characters (a generalization of Hamming distance).
C. Advanced Squatting Techniques
While the two representative studies discussed in §II-B
present examples of systematic typosquatting techniques, other
techniques that exploit visual, hardware, and sound similarities
have been explored as well. In the following, we review those
techniques and their use.
1) Homograph Attacks: Per Holgers et al. [18], the ho-
mograph attack relies on the visual similarity of letters or
strings that might be confused with one another. For example,
an attacker can exploit the fact that the lower-case letter ‘L’
(l) is visually confusable with the upper-case letter ‘i’ (I) in
sans-serif fonts and register www.paypai.comwhich targets
the popular payment site PayPal. The end result, in san-serif
font, looks very similar to the original: www.paypal.com vs
www.paypaI.com. Alarming as it may seem, the measure-
ment results of Holgers et al. shows that these homograph
attacks are rare and not severe in nature. However, these
types of attacks may continue to be an attractive choice
for would-be cyber-criminals since it can fool most users–
as demonstrated in the user study “Why Phishing Works”
by Dhamija et al. [13], where 90.9% of their participants
were fooled by such an attack. In that particular case, the
researchers generated a phishing website that was an exact
replica of the Bank of the West homepage that was hosted at
www.bankofthevvest.com, with two “v”s instead of a
“w” in the domain name.
2) Bitsquatting: This unique approach to domain squatting
was introduced in 2011 by Artem Dinaburg at the BlackHat
Security Conference. This technique relies on random bit-
errors to redirect connections intended for popular domains
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF TYPO DOMAIN IDENTIFICATION APPROACHES. †www.MillerSmiles.co.uk is one of the internet’s leading anti-phishing sites, maintaining a
massive archive of phishing and identity theft email scams.
Approach Authoritative Domains Typo Model(s) Typo Domains
Generated
Active Typo Do-
mains
Wang 2006 [32]
Alexa Top 10,000 (1) Missing-Dot 10,000 51% (5,094)
Alexa Top 30 (1-5) 3,136 71%(2,233)
MillerSmiles† Top 30 (1-5) 3,780 42%(1,596)
Top 50 Children’s Sites (1-5) 7,094 38%(2,685)
Keats 2007 [19] Top 2,771 (Various Sources) (1-5) 1,920,256 7% (127,381)
McAfee Labs 2008 [16] Top 2,000 (Unknown Source) Unknown Unknown 80,000
Banerjee 2008 [9] Top 900 (Various Sources) (6-8) ∼3 million 35%
Moore 2010 [25] Alexa Top 3,264 (1-5) 1,910,738 ∼49%(938,000)
Szurdi 2014 [30] Alexa Top 1 million (1-5) ∼4.7 million ∼20%
Agten 2015 [7] Alexa Top 500 (1-5) 28,179 61% (17,172)
[14]. To test this theory, Dinaburg conducted an experiment
and registered 30 bitsquatted versions of popular do-
mains (e.g. www.mic2osoft.com) and logged all HTTP
requests. Much to his surprise, there were a total of 52,317
bitsquat requests from 12,949 unique IP addresses over an
eight-month period. Nikiforakis et al. [28] studied Dinaburg’s
findings further and conducted one of the first large-scale
analysis of the bitsquatting phenomenon. Their results show
that new bitsquatting domains are registered daily and that
these attackers monetize their domains through the use of ads,
abuse of affiliate programs and even malware installations and
distribution. While typosquatting relies on humans to make
mistakes, bitsquatting on the other hand relies on computers
(hardware) to make mistakes.
3) Soundsquatting: Discovered by Nikiforakis et al. [26]
while researching domain squatting, soundsquatting takes
advantage of the similarity of words with regard to sound
and user confusion on which word represents the desired
concept. Unlike typosquatting, soundsquatting does not rely
on the typographical mistakes made by users–it is based on
homophones, which are two words that sound the same but
spelled differently (e.g. “ate” and “eight”). To verify how much
this soundsquatting technique is used in the wild, Nikiforakis
et al. developed a tool to generate possible soundsquatted
domains from a list of target domains. Using the Alexa top
10,000 sites, they were able to generate 8,476 soundsquatted
domains where 1,823 (21.5%) of those were already registered.
The results presented in [26] indeed show that soundsquatting
is a viable threat that should be taken into account when
defending against domain squatters.
4) Typosquatting Cross-site Scripting (TXSS): In a study
conducted by Nikiforakis et al. [27] that examined malicious
JavaScript inclusions, they identified a new type of vulnera-
bility that occurs when a web developer mistypes the address
of a JavaScript library in their HTML pages or JavaScript
code. This simple mistake allows an attacker to register the
mistyped domain and easily compromise the site that includes
the script. To further explore the impact of this type of
attack, the researchers registered a typo variation of a popu-
lar JavaScript inclusion domain (googlesyndicatio.com
vs. googlesyndication.com) and observed its traffic:
163,188 unique visitors over the course of 15 days. Nikiforakis
et al. argue that the damage of TXSS is much greater than that
of typosquatting, since every user visiting the page containing
the typo will be exposed to malicious code hosted on the
attacker’s site.
D. Features of Typosquatted Domains
In the following, we review features of typosquatted domain
names as confirmed by measurements and their evolution over
time, including length of domain names (§II-D1), popularity of
domain names (§II-D2), popularity of top-level domain (TLD)
(§II-D3), and domain landing behavior (§II-D4).
1) Domain Name Length: One of the features of domain
names investigated for its correlation with typosquatting is
their length. For example, while investigating if domain name
length affects the chances of being typosquatted, Banerjee et
al. [9] observed that more than 10% of all possible “phony”
typosquatted sites registered on the Internet have URLs with
less than 10 characters. This fulfills their expectation that
typosquatters target domains with shorter names, since popular
sites often have short names.
However, in a contradictory study by Moore and Edelman
[25], the authors show that no matter the length of the popular
domain, typo domains within the Damerau-Levenshtein dis-
tance of one or adjacent-keyboard distance of one from popu-
lar domains were overwhelmingly confirmed as typosquatted.
Naturally, we can expect that as the length of domain names
increases the probability of it being typosquatted increases
since the number of possible typo variations increases. This
concept is solidified in the results of the 2015 study by Agten
et al. [7], which concluded that typosquatters have started
targeting longer authoritative domains in the years following
2009, due to the fact that most short typosquatting domains
were already in use.
2) Domain Name Popularity: Another feature of domains
names that has been investigated for its correlation with
typosquatting is their popularity. It is naturally expected that
typosquatters will target the most popular domain names to
maximize the return on their investment (e.g., the number of
visits by unsuspecting users). The results of Banerjee et al. [9]
initially suggest that the percentage of active typosquatting
domains for a given authoritative domain decreases signifi-
cantly with the declining popularity. This is in contrast to
the results presented by Szurdi et al. [30], who performed
a comprehensive study of typosquatting domain registrations
within the .com TLD—the largest TLD in the domain name
ecosystem. They concluded that 95% of typo domains target
the “long tail” of the popularity distribution. The longitudinal
study by Agten et al. [7] also confirms this trend, suggesting
a shift in trends and behaviors of typosquatters.
3) Effect of the Top-Level Domain: The popularity of a
TLD has been also investigated as a feature for its correlation
with typosquatted domain names. For example, since the
.com TLD was introduced as one of the first TLDs when
the Domain Name System (DNS) was first implemented in
January 1985 [2], it makes up a large portion of the total
number of registered domain names (As of June 30, 2015, the
total number of registered domain names was 294 million, out
of which 117.9 million domain names were registered under
.com, making up roughly 40% of the total domain names
(http://bit.ly/1VKiMr3)). As such, a majority of the existing
studies conducted on typosquatting have only considered do-
main names in the .com TLD. In their results, Banerjee et al.
[9] observed that for nearly a quarter of all initial .com URLs,
at least 50% of all possible phony sites exist; confirming that
a domain name ending with .com has a high chance of being
typosquatted. Interestingly, the results of Agten et al. [7] finds
that certain country-code TLDs (.uk, .jp, etc.) affect the
number of typosquatted domains they contain due to either an
unconventional domain dispute policy or domain cost (e.g.,
cheaper domain names are more likely to be typosquatted).
Additionally, the TLD portion of a domain name may
also be a target for exploitation. For example, one .com
domain may have a malicious .org counterpart unbeknownst
to the original registrant of the .com domain. A noteworthy
example of this was mentioned in [12], where unsuspecting
viewers inadvertently typed www.whitehouse.com instead
of www.whitehouse.gov and got exposed to questionable
contents instead of the official White House website. Banerjee
et al. [9] further studied this effect and observed that domains
under the .com TLD are impersonated primarily in .biz,
.net and .org domains, and that domains not registered in
the .com TLD extension are impersonated primarily in .com,
.net and .org domains.
4) Probability Models for Domain Landing: The 2015
study by Khan et al. [20] introduced a novel approach for
detecting typosquatting domains called the conditional prob-
ability model, which requires a vantage point at the network
level to examine DNS and HTTP traffic records. This model
identifies domains that have a high proportion of visitors
leaving soon after landing on a site (domain name), followed
by a visit to a more popular site (domain name) with a similar
name. Specifically, they generated pairs of domains (d1,d2)
such that each visit was performed within 33 seconds of
each other and the Damerau-Levenshtein edit distance between
the two domains is one. When dealing with lexically-similar
domain pairs, where one of the two domains is unlikely a typo
of another, e.g., nhl.com and nfl.com, the advantage of
applying the conditional probability model is that it does not
correlate such domain pairs. In the results reported by Khan
et al., a request for nhl.com is only followed by a load of
nfl.com .08% of the time where the reverse rate is even
lower at < 0.01%. However, they also reported that visits to
the site eba.com are followed by visits to ebay.com 90%
of the time, thus indicating that visits to eba.com are likely
to be typos.
III. MONETIZATION STRATEGIES
The main drive of typosquatting is monetary in the first
place, thus typosquatters employ various techniques to capital-
ize on their typosquatted domain names and generate revenues.
In the following section, we review the various techniques that
typosquatters employ to profit from deliberate registrations of
typo domain names, including domain name parking (§III-A),
domain name ransoming (§III-B), affiliate marketing (§III-C),
hit stealing (§III-D), and scams (§III-E).
A. Domain Parking
The results of the 2006 study by Wang et al. [32] revealed
that a large percentage of typo domains they observed were
“parked”, where there was no real content on these pages
except for advertisements that were generated by domain
parking services. For example, Moore and Edelman’s 2010
study [25] highlighted the case of the typosquatted site
wwwexpendia.com, which led to a web page that contained
a list of sponsored links to travel-related websites. The popular
travel site expedia.com, the most likely target, was at the
top of the list followed by sponsored links to competitors
such as Orbitz.com and CheapTickets.com. In the
most recent study on typosquatting conducted by Agten et al.
[7], domain parking continues to be the most popular scheme
chosen by typosquatters.
Domain parking is not limited to benign applications, as
show in the previous studies and more recently in [23],
but may also include malicious behaviors and activities. For
example, Alrwais et al. [8] explored the dark side of domain
parking, and showed that parked domain names can be actually
used for click fraud, traffic stealing, and spam delivery, all
of which generate more than 40% of the revenue for some
parking services.
B. Selling and Ransoming Domain Names
In addition to being “parked” with advertisements, a ty-
posquatted site may have no content other than being adver-
tised as for sale. In the extreme case, these typo domain names
may be held for ransom–as in the Zuccarini case highlighted
by the 2003 study by Edelman [15]. Edelman found that
the vast majority of the typosquatted domain names acquired
by the infamous cyber-criminal John Zuccarini were often
redirected to websites with sexually-explicit content. For the
owners of the authoritative domain names that Zuccarini’s
typosquatted sites targeted, Edelman argued that having redi-
rections to sexually-explicit content only increased their will-
ingness to pay. Furthermore, Edelman has also pointed out that
Zuccarini may have profited from another source of revenue:
affiliate marketing programs which we review next.
C. Affiliate Marketing
These programs are set up by companies to allow third
parties to collect commissions on sales or referral fees for
redirecting customers to their websites [11]. Such redirection
can be for legitimate [10] or illicit applications [21]. For ex-
ample, the “Amazon Associates” program was one of the first
online affiliate marketing programs that was launched in 1996
[6]. When “Associates” (i.e. affiliates) create URL links and
potential customers click through those links and buy products
from Amazon, the Associates earn referral fees. Typically,
these URL links contain unique identifiers to determine which
affiliate has forwarded visitors. As Agten et al. point out, many
typosquatters abuse such affiliate programs when they redirect
visitors to the intended site, collecting referral fees from the
authoritative owner for a visit that should have been theirs in
the first place [7].
D. Hit Stealing
Not only do typosquatters redirect visitors to their intended
websites (for monetary gain), but they can also forward them
to websites of competitors. Essentially, these typo domain
registrations “steal” traffic meant for authoritative domains.
The study by Agten et al. [7] found that this behavior was
mostly associated with adult sites (and for spam and click
fraud as shown by Alrwais et al. [8]). However, some non-
adult sites steal hits from their competitors in situations
involving Internet marketing companies who draw traffic to
the sites of their customers.
E. Scams
In this scenario, unsuspecting visitors may fall victim to a
scheme that tricks them into divulging personally identifiable
information (PII). As reported in [4], the typosquatted sites
Wikapedia.com and Twtter.com emulated the real sites
(Wikipedia.org and Twitter.com) and displayed ad-
vertisements for contests offering Apple iPads and MacBooks
as prizes. Ultimately, users were prompted to enter their credit
card number and other sensitive information as part of the
contest to claim their prizes.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES
Countermeasures to typosquatting involve technical and
policy-based aspects. Technical aspects to typosquatting, as
indicated in the surveyed work in this study, take the iden-
tification of typosquatted domains as a first step. Then, the
policy-based approach employs legal frameworks to resolve
disputes between registrants in case of typosquatted domain
names. While the technical aspects are treated at length
in §II, in the following we review the policy-based aspects
to countermeasures domain name typosquatting.
In November of 1998, the United States Department of
Commerce identified a private, non-profit organization called
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) as the new entity to oversee the domain name
registration system [3]. As the Internet rapidly expanded
and the number of domain names being registered spiked,
cybersquatters and typosquatters alike were quickly snatching
up available domain names. In response, the ICANN intro-
duced the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP) in late 1999 which states that a domain registrant is
required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding
in the event that a third party (a “complainant”) disputes such
a domain [5]. As Moore and Edelman [25] point out, while
the majority of UDRP arbitration proceedings are successful
for the complainants, the filing fees can range from $1,300 to
$4,000—since December 1, 2002 (in use as of March 2016),
the world intellectual property organization (WIPO), one of
the main arbitration organization assigned by ICANN, charges
a tiered fee structure; $1,500 for up to five domains, and
$2,000 for up to 10 domains in a single complaint reviewed by
one panelist, and $4,000 and $5,000, respectively, with three
panelists (http://bit.ly/1MHwR1c). While this might not be a
lot of money for big companies, it might discourage smaller
companies from filing a complaint, especially if targeted by
large number of typosquatters/typosquatted domains.
Since the only remedies available to a complainant in the
UDRP are the cancellation or the transfer of the domain name,
another alternative became available through legal means:
The Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). As
noted in Shields v. Zuccarini [1]: “On November 29, 1999, the
ACPA became law, making it illegal for a person to register
or to use with the “bad faith” intent to profit from an Internet
domain name that is “identical or confusingly similar” to the
distinctive or famous trademark or Internet domain name of
another person or company.”
As mentioned earlier, the typosquatters in the Facebook
case were found to have violated the ACPA and were ordered
to surrender their domain names as well as pay Facebook,
netting them a total of $2.8 million in damages [29]. While
both the UDRP and ACPA can have successful outcomes for
the authoritative domain name owners who decide to take
the policy intervention route, eliminating the opportunity via
defensive registration is perhaps the best strategy.
Defensive registration is a tactic where companies and trade-
mark owners will deliberately register typo variations of their
own domains, keeping it out of the hands of typosquatters and
thus redirecting users to the proper domain. Despite this simple
strategy, the results of Agten et al. shows that only 156 of the
Alexa top 500 have defensive domain registrations, meaning
that 344 domains (68.8%) have no defensive registrations
whatsoever [7].
In line with defensive registration efforts, various registries
offer domain name suggestion and trademark clearinghouse
services to reduce the risks associated with typosquatting and
typosquatted domain name registration by speculators. For
example, ICANN specifies the structure and pricing of trade-
mark clearinghouse, which can be deployed by any interested
registry (e.g., Neustar, Nominet, Verisign, etc.)1. Furthermore,
1http://bit.ly/1Sn77OJ
Verisign provides name suggestion services that may include,
among their suggestions, typosquatted domains2.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN DIRECTIONS
In this paper we reviewed the landscape of domain name
typosquatting and identified techniques used for typosquatting,
methods used for their monetization, and countermeasures,
including policy-based approaches.
While the current state-of-the-art highlights the problem,
detection techniques, and policy-based approaches, less work
is done on the technical front towards defending against
this threat. To this end, we foresee a great opportunity in
pursuing technical solutions to typosquatting utilizing features
and inartistic characteristics of typosquatted domain names. In
particular, we are currently pursuing three directions to realize
informed solutions to the problem at hand:
End-user feedback. The nature of a domain name is often
inferred from certain side channels, as by Khan et al. [20], or
the type of contents it delivers as per Agten et al. [7]. However,
none of the prior work considered end-users’ feedback on the
nature of those domain names, and whether they are domains
of interest to them. Such ground truth is valuable, and could
highlight new trends and features of typosquatted domain
names that are not obvious, or captured by the algorithmic
models we know so far. On the other hand, we envision a
system that utilizes the well-known features of typosquatted
domain names (blacklists of them or new features discovered
using users’ feedback) to inform users about the risks associ-
ated with domain names they are about to visit. Such feedback
can be delivered to users in a usable way in the browser.
DNS-level filtering. While the user-centric approach to the
problem provides the highest fidelity capturing the users’
intent, it does not scale well. To this end, we also foresee
a complementary solution that outsources all computations
and decisions to the network. For example, based on a fine-
grained ground truth of typosquatted domain names, one
solution to prevent users from landing on those domain names
and exposing themselves to attackers is to implement the
blocking of such typosquatted domain names at the DNS level.
One realization of such approach to implement the defense
using a blacklist as a middlebox in the network. While the
approach scales well, and is agnostic to the behavior of users
and interaction with the defense system (unlike the end-user
feedback based solution), it is also agnostic to the users’ intent,
and may block domains of interest to users. Furthermore, the
system would rely on a blacklist that need to be actively and
frequently updated, which comes at cost.
Up-to-date view via measurements. Many of the studies in
the literature concerning the features of typosquatted domain
names, their correlation with domain properties, and models
for generating them are outdated. Furthermore, some of the
recent studies concerning a partial set of those feature refute
well-established belief in the earlier studies on this topic. To
this end, we foresee a fruitful direction in revising those studies
2http://bit.ly/22yW0Xq
in light of recent datasets (and previously not studied TLDs).
In particular, as the use of new generic TLDs (gTLDs) is on
the rise, we will extend our measurements to those TLDs in the
pursuit for new features for finer understanding of the threat
of domain name typosquatting and its evolution.
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